


THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



# Bulletin

Vol. XXXVII, No. 956



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# Bulletin

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## The Problem of Disarmament

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge  
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*<sup>1</sup>

In convening this Commission to discuss the report of its Subcommittee,<sup>2</sup> we recognize the urgency which all of us feel about the problem of disarmament.

The United States fully shares this sense of urgency. The record of the 5½ months during which the Subcommittee met in London will bear this out. This session, during which the Subcommittee met 71 times, was the longest in its history.

During this period the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada made extensive studies and basic reviews of policy. Our position was adapted continuously to seize upon every new opportunity for progress. The sessions of the Subcommittee have been marked by the unprecedented participation of both the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom and by consultations in London with the Foreign Minister of France during the sessions. The serious and businesslike tone of the greater part of the discussions led to a most careful and comprehensive examination of basic issues. But despite this no agreement has yet been reached.

The United States believes the Commission and the General Assembly should review the record of these negotiations calmly and in a spirit of good will. We hope and expect that from these discussions new light will be thrown on this very complex problem. This review and discussion can help to assure that future negotiations will meet with a greater measure of success.

<sup>1</sup> Made in the Disarmament Commission on Sept. 30 (U.S./U.N. press release 2744).

<sup>2</sup> U.N. docs. DC/112 dated Aug. 1, 1957, and DC/113 dated Sept. 11, 1957.

Disarmament is a problem that concerns all nations, large and small. Since this is the parent body of the Subcommittee, the states represented around this table, without exception, have an especially deep and legitimate interest in the solution of this problem.

This is another reason we welcome this discussion. It provides an opportunity to outline the situation as we see it and to explain how we have tried to meet the issues.

### Joint Proposals

The proposals which the United States, jointly with the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, has submitted are to be found in document DC/SC.1/66.<sup>3</sup> We believe that document is of historic importance. It outlines a practical, realistic program which will appeal to all men who seek peace. It is submitted with the full and unequivocal support of the sponsoring governments. It is a sincere attempt to balance the security interests of all, while taking account of the views and aspirations expressed by others in this body, in the Assembly, and during the negotiations in the Subcommittee.

At the heart of these proposals are six general objectives:

The first general objective is the early cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, under effective international control, and the complete devotion of future production of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes.

We propose that this cessation of production

<sup>3</sup> For text of the four-power working paper of Aug. 29, see BULLETIN of Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.

take place as soon as an inspection system capable of verifying it has been agreed and put into effect. Acceptance of this proposal would mean an immediate end to the buildup of nuclear-arms stockpiles. It is a progressive proposal, entirely feasible and in line with the resolutions adopted by the Assembly.

Second, the cessation of testing of nuclear weapons, under effective international control.

We propose that, at the outset of a first-stage disarmament agreement, nuclear-weapons tests be suspended for a period of 24 months while arrangements are being worked out to insure the cutoff of fissionable production for weapons purposes. The second 12 months of this suspension depends only upon making progress in this direction and on the installation of an inspection system to police the test suspension. Nations would be free to resume testing if, after 2 years of fissionable production, cutoff had not been put into effect.

Thirdly, we seek reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments.

We have proposed a practical start in this direction. Our approach to the problem of reducing conventional armaments avoids many of the difficulties which we would otherwise face. We propose that specified and agreed modern armaments of land, air, and sea be deposited in storage depots under international supervision. We are prepared to begin negotiations at any time on the specific arms for deposit. At the same time we have expressed a willingness to accept for ourselves a first-step ceiling of 2.5 million armed forces. We have agreed to specify second- and third-stage ceilings of 2.1 and 1.7 million. We hope and believe that a first-stage agreement will result in progress toward the settlement of a number of the outstanding problems which create international friction, and make feasible the attainment of lower force levels.

A fourth objective is the progressive establishment of systems of open inspection with ground and aerial components.

We have proposed that a beginning be made in areas in which protection against surprise attack is of greatest importance. We have also reaffirmed the proposal originally made at Geneva by President Eisenhower in 1955 and have, with our allies, agreed to include also territory of Can-

ada and important areas in Europe. This proposal alone, which has been overwhelmingly endorsed by the Assembly, would result in a safer and more secure world for all. We are ready also to include areas in which free-world bases are located wherever they may be, provided the countries concerned agree. We are ready to make a modest beginning of this reciprocal open inspection and then expand it in later stages.

The fifth principle foresees the beginning of the elimination of nuclear weapons by transferring on an equitable and agreed basis stocks of fissionable materials from previous weapons production to internationally supervised peaceful uses.

This proposal is in accordance with the objective set by the United Nations. It is a logical and feasible step toward meeting that objective. Most important, it would insure a lessening of the nuclear threat.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we seek agreement on measures to control the newest threat to peace: the outerspace missile.

This weapon is too new for us to be able to present precise and detailed proposals to deal with it. But it is potentially so dangerous that it cannot be ignored. We propose as our next objective that means be designed to assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be for exclusively scientific and peaceful purposes.

Mr. Chairman, this seems to us to be a sensible and practical program which can be implemented now. If put into effect, the security of every nation represented here would be increased.

We hope through this and the subsequent Assembly debate to achieve an understanding of our proposals and of their merits. We are confident that this Commission and all in the General Assembly who strive for peace will support the principles I have outlined.

Although the Soviet Union has so far rejected the proposals we have put forward, we hope its negative attitude will change when it comes to appreciate the sentiments of this Commission and the Assembly. This should not be a forlorn hope. We recall the Soviet Union's critical first rejection of "open skies" aerial inspection, of the need for on-the-spot inspection for nuclear-test cessation, of the first-stage force ceilings of 2.5 million, and of the International Atomic Energy Agency.



But we also recall their later acceptance of all of these proposals.

### **Progress in Right Direction**

The negotiations of the past year have not been fruitless. It has demonstrated the usefulness of the Subcommittee and the wisdom of the Assembly in setting up a forum for discussion among those "principally involved." There has been a narrowing of the differences that we faced at the last General Assembly. The remaining obstacles are large and important, but there has been progress in the right direction.

It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union in the course of these negotiations has modified certain of its longstanding positions which for years have blocked the way to agreement. It accepted the idea of a limited first-stage agreement. It seemed finally to have recognized the utility of systems of air and ground inspections as a safeguard against surprise attack, and the idea of beginning with agreed zones of inspection. It seems to be willing at least to defer and omit from a first-stage agreement its demand for "elimination" of nuclear weapons, which by its own admission could not now be verified and is therefore an impossible demand. It appeared to be moving toward a more sincere and constructive approach to the nuclear-testing problem when in June it agreed that a suspension of testing should be accompanied by monitoring systems to insure compliance. It has indicated acceptance of the idea of international disarmament depots in which arms would be stored.

Seeking earnestly to seize upon every opportunity to move toward agreement, the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada have made more significant changes in their positions. These are reflected in the four-power working paper of August 29. These proposals go far to meet the Soviet objection that the United States was silent on the steps which might follow a first-stage disarmament agreement. Accordingly, we have offered concrete figures for second- and third-stage force levels on which we would negotiate in good faith.

On the subject of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union objected that cessation of tests was to be delayed until a system to insure that fissionable materials would be used for peaceful purposes

was in effect. We agreed then that the suspension of tests would take effect before this system was in operation. We suggested a period of 10 months, but this was rejected as too short. Consequently we accepted the period suggested by the Soviet Union—2 years. We did so in the hope that the Soviet Union in turn would agree in principle to the cutoff of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and that work should proceed to design the necessary inspection system.

When the original proposal for aerial inspection was made by President Eisenhower, it was rejected by the Soviet Union. We then suggested progressive installation of zones of inspection beginning in limited areas in hopes that this would lead the Soviet Union to accept this important proposal. We have offered alternative suggestions for starting this program.

The Soviet Union at first objected to our disarmament proposals as not coping with the nuclear threat and claimed that we intended to do nothing about the stocks of nuclear weapons which now exist. We have in fact proposed that we not only stop adding to these stocks of weapons but that we begin to reduce them by transferring their fissionable-materials contents to peaceful uses under international supervision.

Mr. President, I think the above shows that we have on several occasions made significant movement toward the position of the Soviet Union.

But there is one point of disagreement which is of major significance and on which we would welcome the affirmation of the Commission's and the Assembly's support. This is our proposal for the stopping of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Soviet acceptance of this principle would take us a great distance toward achievement of an agreement on disarmament, for it is now one of the most important barriers to success. We urge the Soviet Union to reconsider its opposition to this step.

If the Soviet Union accepted this proposal, we would finally be able to see a light at the end of the tunnel after these 12 difficult years of talk and negotiation. The buildup of stocks of nuclear weapons would stop. Mankind could devote the genius and the great resources in men, time, material, and money now going into costly nu-

clear plants to peaceful ends. We could not take a greater step for peace.

### Question of Nuclear Testing

We believe that this question is closely related to the matter of the continuation of nuclear tests. The United States has proposed the suspension of nuclear tests; we have done so in a way which makes the ending of these tests significant and which thus genuinely advances the cause of peace.

The position of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada on this question is that there is a logical and necessary link between the testing of nuclear weapons and their production. Testing is the top of the iceberg that bears testimony to the dangerous mass below. To stop tests but to continue producing weapons would make no contribution to the solution of the real issues that confront us. Until a disarmament agreement putting real limits on the nuclear threat is achieved, we cannot accept an unsound limitation which could prevent us from improving our ability to defend ourselves. To stop nuclear tests alone would not meet the real danger which comes from ever-increasing stockpiles of nuclear weapons in a number of countries.

We know that nuclear testing has given concern to many sincere people throughout the world. We believe these fears are ill-founded, but we respect their motivations. It is for this reason that the United States proposed, at the 10th General Assembly, the establishment of a special United Nations committee to study the problem of radiation effects. This committee will report to the Assembly by July 1958, and its conclusions will no doubt be thoroughly reviewed at that time.

Then, Mr. President, let us also think of those who may see in the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States a threat to dreams of conquest and expansion. Such persons would like to see this element of our strength singled out for separate and restrictive treatment. Yet how obvious it is that these weapons enable the free world to stand firm against aggression by the large manpower resources of the Communist world. In fact, it is reasonable to believe that the possession of these weapons by the free world has helped to prevent the subjugation of still more sovereign and independent governments.

Therefore, we will not fall victim to a policy which attempts to strip us of parts of our defen-

sive strength which are peculiarly important to us and our allies. We cannot, therefore, in the interests of our own security and that of world peace agree to stop the development of nuclear weapons unless there are also restrictions on production. As long as nuclear weapons can be used and produced by others, we must insure that we are free to continue the development and research of which testing is an integral part. For the same reasons we will accept no ban on the use of these weapons which does not effectively apply to all instruments of war. Nor will we accept a paper prohibition of stocks of these weapons when we know there is no way to insure that such an obligation is faithfully carried out.

During the debate in the 10th General Assembly the Representative of New Zealand [F. H. Corner] made a very wise speech, which bears rereading. At one point he said that "all weapons—the blockbuster as well as the atomic bomb—are bad and . . . . If war and aggression are to be prevented, no single weapon should be singled out but all weapons must be brought under a single comprehensive scheme of disarmament which can be policed and enforced."

We commend our proposals, which include suspension of testing with other measures of real disarmament and which therefore go further than a mere test ban, as the best way to get started. Our proposals would insure that the nuclear buildup would be stopped short and gradually diminished. A start would be made toward an open world in which the chances of surprise attack and miscalculations which are bred in fear and lead to war would be reduced to the vanishing point. New horizons of peace and prosperity would open before us.

We believe that the overwhelming majority of the members of this Commission, upon a thoughtful review of the record before them, will share this conviction.

### Offer to Soviet Union

Now, Mr. President, as I conclude let me say this: In essence, we, that is to say Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have made and we do now make this offer to the Soviet Union:

We will suspend nuclear tests for an initial period expected to be 2 years but also subject to further extension, provided you, the Soviet

Union, agree on establishing an effective inspection system, air and ground, on stopping production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and reducing present stocks, on starting outer-space missile control, and on reducing armed forces.

Mr. President, we do not insist that all these things be done at once. An agreement that they should be done in acceptable stages is enough to get this program under way, and suspension of testing would be the first thing to happen.

If the Soviet Union is not willing to commit itself to steps to reduce the danger of surprise attack, if it is not prepared to commit itself to steps to stop the future piling up of nuclear weapons and their spreading throughout the world, then I say with all the solemnity of which I am capable that we are faced with a present major danger far graver than the problematic minor danger that comes from the testing of atomic weapons in order to make the new power available for defense without a dangerous fallout. Such unwillingness would confront us and other nations of the free world with a powerful nation whose conduct could only be explained by a determination to impose military domination on the world. There wouldn't be any other explanation. If that be the case, then we and peace-loving humanity everywhere would have no alternative but to concentrate all our effort on meeting that danger. All else fades into insignificance.

It is for the Soviet Union to speak and tell us what we must contemplate.

## **Mr. Dulles and Mr. Gromyko Discuss U.S.-Soviet Relations**

*Following is the text of a joint statement issued on October 5 at the close of a meeting between Secretary Dulles and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.*

Press release 560 dated October 5

Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Gromyko met for approximately four hours and dealt with a number of major topics. The meeting was held at the invitation of the United States Secretary of State to discuss questions concerning the state of United States-Soviet relations.

The Secretary felt that advantage should be

taken of the Soviet Foreign Minister's presence in the United States in connection with the General Assembly of the United Nations to invite an exchange of views.

Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Gromyko felt that the meeting would enable them to seek clarification of the intentions and positions of their respective Governments on major questions of mutual concern.

They believe that the conversation this afternoon has been helpful in this respect.

The major topics which were brought up in the course of the conversation were the Middle East, disarmament, the situation in Europe, and United States-Soviet contacts.

The Secretary was accompanied at the meeting by Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Mr. Edward L. Freers, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs.

The Soviet Foreign Minister was accompanied by Ambassador Zaroubin and Mr. Oleg Troyanovsky.

## **President and Prime Minister Kishi Exchange Views on Nuclear Tests**

White House press release dated October 4

*The White House on October 4 made public the following exchange of messages between the President and Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi of Japan.*

### **The President's Message**

OCTOBER 3, 1957

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I have for a long time given serious and thoughtful consideration to the issue you raise in your communication of September twenty-fourth regarding the continuation of nuclear testing, which has been the subject of discussion between us in the past.

Unfortunately, I have been able to reach no other conclusion than that for the time being and in the present circumstances, the security of the United States, and, I believe, that of the free world, depends to a great degree upon what we learn from the testing of nuclear weapons. We are at a stage when testing is required for the development of important defensive uses of nuclear weapons, particularly against missiles, sub-

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marines, and aircraft, as well as to reduce further the fallout yield from nuclear weapons. To stop these tests in the absence of effective limitations on nuclear weapons production and on other elements of armed strength and without the opening up of all principal nations to a measure of inspection as a safeguard against surprise attack in which nuclear weapons could be used is a sacrifice which would be dangerous to accept.

We are aware of the preoccupations with the question of health hazards connected with nuclear testing. We believe that these are ill founded. However, we have pledged to conduct those tests which may be necessary only in such a manner as will keep world radiation from rising to more than a small fraction of the levels which might be hazardous. Also, as you know, the General Assembly has established a scientific committee to study this problem. This committee is due to report by July 1958, and its findings will no doubt be fully debated in the United Nations.

We believe that nuclear tests can and should be suspended if other limitations of the type I have mentioned are agreed upon. Accordingly, the United States has joined with the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and Canada in presenting proposals which provide for the suspension of testing in this context. Of special importance, I think, is the proposal that further production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes be stopped and a beginning be made in the reduction of existing weapons stockpiles. We believe that if this proposal is widely supported in the General Assembly, it will be accepted by the Soviet Union. In this event, we would be assured that atomic energy in the future would be devoted to peaceful purposes everywhere in the world.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## The Prime Minister's Message

SEPTEMBER 24, 1957

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honour to call Your Excellency's attention to the proposal submitted by the Japanese delegation to the present session of the General Assembly on 23 September, 1957 on the question of disarmament and nuclear test explosions.

Japan as a peace-loving nation ardently desires prompt realization of a general disarmament, particularly, prohibition of the manufacture, use and test of nuclear weapons as is clearly stated in the several resolutions of the Diet, which have been duly transmitted to Your Excellency's government. My government, recognizing the urgent necessity of ending all nuclear test explosions, has repeatedly requested your government to suspend such tests. But to our profound disappointment, none of the countries concerned has so far taken the initiative to suspend nuclear test explosions. But they all go on repeating their tests, creating a vicious circle of the most regrettable kind, which does nothing to lessen distrust among nations.

The recent Disarmament Conference, while giving indications of partial agreement among the powers concerned, came to an impasse on account of the disagreement of views as to whether suspension of nuclear test explosions should be carried out in connection with other aspects of disarmament, or it should take place separately from them. This difference in opinion is perhaps irreconcilable, and it may be extremely difficult to resolve the present impasse. But when we consider the proposition on the one hand that disarmament negotiation be carried on while continuing with nuclear test explosions, and the proposition on the other that the negotiation be continued after having first put a stop to nuclear tests, the preferability of the latter, from the standpoint of humanity, is obvious; it is sure to be welcomed by world public opinion. I, therefore, earnestly request Your Excellency to make a thorough study of the proposal of the Japanese Delegation. Acceptance will, my government believes, pave the way for the solution of the question of disarmament and nuclear test explosions, which is eagerly wished by the Japanese people and all peoples of the world.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

NOBUSUKE KISHI  
Prime Minister of Japan



## First Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency

*Remarks by Lewis L. Strauss  
Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission<sup>1</sup>*

Fifteen years ago today, in Chicago, Enrico Fermi and his associates laid the first course of graphite blocks for an atomic pile. This structure became man's first successful apparatus for the control of a great force of nature. This primitive reactor has long since been dismantled, but I have brought with me today, and shall deposit here with the Agency, what I believe is the last of these graphite blocks from the world's first reactor. I do this in the hope that it may become the beginning of a collection, or a museum, of the early days of atomic energy and by reason of its association be symbolic of a great truth.

For it is a truth that atomic energy belongs to the whole world of men. Enrico Fermi, a naturalized citizen of my country, had been born in Italy. Working with him in those momentous days were men and women from many other lands—from England, Canada, Germany, and Hungary. Their scientific education was based upon the great contributions to human knowledge made by Einstein, Bohr, Hahn, Strassman, Meitner, Frisch, the Curies, Mendeleev, Rutherford, von Neumann, Raman, Millikan, the Comptons, Lawrence, and many other scientists whose birthplaces, as you may see, are scattered all round the terrestrial globe. Atomic energy belongs to no one nation or group of nations.

We are fortunate to be here today, for this is one of the most momentous occasions in which men of our generation can hope to participate. The Supreme Intelligence, who created us all and whom—depending on our places of origin—we worship under different names, endowed man with

the power of choice between good and evil, between the blessing and the curse. And for once in man's long history we appear to have chosen wisely. If, as I believe, this is pleasing to the Creator, then He may look with favor upon the work which we do here. May we do what is good in His sight.

### Genesis of the President's Plan

Four years ago this week President Eisenhower gave his approval to a plan upon which I had been working for the establishment of this Agency. The genesis of the plan, however, was an idea that had occurred to the President some months earlier. For, deeply concerned with the drift of nations toward an atomic deadlock, or even worse, an atomic war, and aware of the failure of all previous efforts to break through the barriers erected by fear and mistrust, President Eisenhower had conceived of using the peaceful applications of atomic energy on an international scale and by so doing to persuade all nations with atomic materials to make them available to an international body. These contributions would be in amounts at first modest and later substantial. They would be used only for benign purposes. They would mean that much less which could be manufactured into weapons of destruction.

This plan was presented to the world in President Eisenhower's historic address before the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 8, 1953. Since that date many earnest men from more than 80 nations, including many of you who are here today, have worked untiringly to bring that exalted idea to life.

Thanks to you, today it lives.

<sup>1</sup>Made at the first conference of the IAEA at Vienna, Austria, on Oct. 1. Admiral Strauss is chairman of the U.S. delegation.



My Government has made available for acquisition by the Agency 5,000 kilograms of contained uranium-235, the rare isotope, and President Eisenhower has announced that we will increase this amount by adding to it as much as all other nations place at the disposal of the Agency between now and July 1960. By a letter to the President of this Conference as required by the statute of the Agency, I am making this proposal of my Government formal. The Congress of the United States has overwhelmingly approved of this action, and this Conference is highlighted by the presence here today of a number of the United States Senators and Congressmen who are members of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and who have come here to evidence their interest.<sup>2</sup>

It is the hope of all my fellow countrymen that at this Conference or soon thereafter other nations will take similar action to make fissionable material available to the Agency.

We look to see this Agency and its headquarters become a center for the dissemination of such material for peaceful uses and, among its other vital functions, for the spread of knowledge. Not least among these functions is, of course, to build a foundation of understanding and trust among peoples—by showing them the blessings which can flow from the peaceful atom. We believe that people who are prosperous, healthy, happy, and free are people who will not willingly or aggressively or capriciously commit the terrible sin of initiating war. The International Atomic Energy Agency is an organization dedicated to peace. This is the high purpose to which we who are here today likewise dedicate ourselves.

#### Message From President Eisenhower

It is now my privilege and great honor to read a message from the President of the United States of America:

"Mr. President, and Members of the Conference:

<sup>2</sup> For an announcement of the U.S. delegation, see BULLETIN of Oct. 14, 1957, p. 618.

"The prayers and hopes of millions of people of every race and faith attend the deliberations which you begin in Vienna today.

"You have been given the historic responsibility of translating a new concept into positive action for the benefit of all mankind.

"No other Conference in history has ever begun more auspiciously. The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which you are about to implement, represents the will and the aspirations of more nations than ever before subscribed to an international treaty.

"Yours, therefore, is a sacred trust. You hold in your custody the conscience of the peoples of the world. They look hopefully to you to further the practical program whereby the fissioned atom will cease to be a symbol of fear and will be transformed into the means of providing them with richer, healthier and happier lives.

"For the past several years the people of the United States have dedicated their hearts and minds to the success of this undertaking. Speaking in their behalf, let me on this occasion earnestly reaffirm that consecration of our efforts. It is our fervent hope that the Agency will become the focal point for promoting and distributing the beneficence of atomic energy to every nation of the world, large and small.

"The opportunities which now lie before you are many; the challenges which you will have to meet and solve will be great. But with faith and continued friendly cooperation, such as has marked the creation of the Agency, our generation can make of atomic energy a gift for which mankind will be forever grateful.

"May this Conference be inscribed in history as marking the turning point where man's fears of the atom yielded to hope, and to the wider cooperation necessary to establish that peace which is desired of all men.

"It is my prayer that the splitting of the atom, under the wise administration of the International Atomic Energy Agency, may some day unify a divided world.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER"

## "The Communists Also Have Their Problems"

by Allen W. Dulles

Director of Central Intelligence<sup>1</sup>

It may seem a bit paradoxical that the Director of Central Intelligence should be addressing the Advertising Council. You represent the trend—which seems quite irresistible—that "it pays to advertise." I am the head of the silent service and cannot advertise my wares. Sometimes, I admit, this is a bit irksome. Often we know a bit more about what is going on in the world than we are credited with, and we realize a little advertisement might improve our public relations. For major reasons of policy, however, public relations must be sacrificed to the security of our operations.

You and we, however, have much in common. We are both deeply concerned with the impact of ideas on human behavior. In carrying out one of the Central Intelligence Agency's important tasks—that of estimating future developments in the foreign field—the ability to analyze public reactions is essential in our job. We, as you, have to judge whether ideas have a transitory value or will have an enduring effect upon the behaviors of people.

In particular, it is a fascinating study to follow the development of the ideas behind certain of the great revolutionary movements. Some such movements were promoted by religious fervor, some by brute military force, many by a combination of might and assertions of right. These movements have had their day—long or short. Some have had broad geographic appeal; some were limited to a particular area; and the history of some has never really been deciphered. Our civilization, despite the Dark Ages, has been

tough enough to survive the most vigorous and long-lived revolutionary assaults on mind and body.

Tonight I propose to give you the results of an analysis of the recent happenings within the Soviet Communist world, and I shall be bold enough to draw certain conclusions which support my conviction that radical changes are taking place and more are in the making.

The initial ideological fervor, I believe, is seeping out of the international revolutionary Communist movement, particularly in the Soviet Union. Marxism was not designed for the atomic age of the mid-20th century. Effective as communism has been in establishing control of two powerful nations and imposing its will on a number of satellite countries, it is beginning to encounter difficulties in coping with the complex industrial and technological problems of today. Further, while some of the industrial and military achievements of both the U.S.S.R. and Communist China have stirred the pride of its citizens, communism has failed to devise a political system capable of commanding the loyalties of governed peoples without resort to the cruel barbarities of mass terror. It has satisfied neither the ideals, the aspirations, nor the needs of the people subject to its domination.

### Major Changes in International Communism

Accordingly, the leaders of international communism are being forced to review their situation and to consider major changes—changes which strike at the very heart of the system. The theories of Marx and Lenin proved useful window dressing behind which the Communists established their monopoly of political power, the so-

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Advertising Council at San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 19.

called dictatorship of the proletariat. These ideas are of little aid in guiding the Communist dictatorship in meeting the challenge of the world today.

What prophet is there left in Soviet Russia? Marx and Lenin are given lip service, but their advice and counsel have little applicability today. Stalin has been discredited, though his embarrassing remains are still on view in the Kremlin. Khrushchev is unlikely to blossom out as a creator of new Communist doctrine, though his impetuosity and unpredictability remain a matter of grave concern in an international situation as tense as that of today. Mao retains his role as a prophet in China, but he, too, is having his troubles.

When Stalin disappeared from the scene a little less than 5 years ago, he left a clouded heritage. His later years of dictatorship had brought the Soviet Union close to war and disaster. Ventures in Greece, at Berlin, and finally in Korea had opened the eyes even of the credulous abroad. Domestically, harsh measures of forced industrialization and military buildup, successful as they were technologically, had left little place for meeting the needs of the people.

Moreover, the systematic cruelties of the secret police had created popular unrest, suspicion, and despair. Khrushchev told us the story of how terror ridden Soviet life had become in his now well-known secret speech at the 20th Party Congress over a year ago—a speech still unpublished in the Communist world. It was too strong medicine for popular consumption, although bits and pieces of it were allowed to leak out.

Stalin's successors had the difficult task of tempering a dictatorship but yet maintaining complete authority, of doing away with the Stalinist type of secret-police repression and yet keeping the people under iron discipline, of maintaining a tight rein but still creating the impression, and giving some of the substance, of a new measure of freedom.

Beria found it hard to fit into this picture. He did not want to relinquish his personal control of the secret police, through which he hoped to gain the top position. His plot was discovered, and he was liquidated. Since then the military seems to have become the decisive element where force or the threat of force was required to support a political decision.

### Collective Dictatorship

After the Beria crisis we were told that the dictatorship of the proletariat had become a collective leadership—more properly described as a collective dictatorship. True enough, the crisis of readjustment to the post-Stalin era brought together in uneasy harmony the surviving members of the governing body known as the Presidium of the party. Many here at home and abroad wrongly estimated that this might be an enduring form of government. Actually, bitter personal rivalries and basic differences of philosophies and outlook remain unreconciled.

The ultimate authority to make crucial decisions must rest firmly somewhere, and that "somewhere" is unlikely for long to be in a collective. Majority rule is appropriate for legislative and judicial bodies, but it does not function satisfactorily in the executive field, where decisiveness of action is essential.

For a time after Stalin's disappearance from the scene, Malenkov tried to lead the collective team, seemingly down a course which promised a better break for the people than they had ever had before. In 1955 he was forced to confess his incapacity and Khrushchev took over, committing himself, like his predecessor, to the collective-rule formula.

Then last June the inevitable irreconcilable conflict of opinions emerged, the collective broke down, and with the approval of the military, in particular Zhukov, Khrushchev eliminated his rivals—Molotov and Kaganovich, who really felt that the old Stalinist and foreign policies were preferable, and Malenkov, who, due to his relative youth, political experience, and apparent popularity, was a dangerous potential rival. At the moment Khrushchev is busily engaged in implicating Malenkov in the crimes of Stalin's later days, classing him as "shadow and tool" of Beria. Since Beria was shot for treason, the threat to Malenkov is naked enough for all to see.

So the history of Soviet governmental changes repeats itself, although in a slightly different pattern from that of the two previous decades. Those recently purged have not yet been liquidated like Beria or eliminated by mock trials such as those of the late 1930's. With a touch of almost sardonic humor, the miscreants have been assigned to the oblivion of Siberia or the darkness of Outer Mongolia.

It was the handpicked Central Committee of the Communist Party, with the backing of the army, which played the decisive role in last summer's changes in the high command. This suggests that the Presidium on its own can no longer deal with recalcitrant members, at least in a situation where the issues are closely drawn and where those to be eliminated are not in a hopeless minority.

The claim that the purpose of these changes was to get back to the pure Leninist communism of the past is camouflage. No differing theories of Communist and Marxist dogma played a decisive role in this struggle. It was a question of power politics in a situation where hard decisions had to be made in both the domestic and foreign fields. There were in fact very deep and fundamental divergences of views among the members of the Presidium, and the collective failed to function because the differences were not susceptible of compromise.

#### **Decentralization of Industry**

Three main issues divided the Soviet leaders. The first concerned the decentralization of industry.

After years of extolling the virtues of a centrally planned economy, some of the Soviet leaders have recently begun to stress the need of local initiative to improve efficiency at the plant level. By the use of local resources it was hoped to ease the burden on transport facilities, minimize duplication of effort, and stimulate managerial initiative. Acting on these theories, Khrushchev recently forced through a program to decentralize away from Moscow many elements of control of the great Soviet industrial machine, in the most sweeping reorganization of the economic management machinery since the first Five-Year Plan was adopted in 1928. Some 27 specialized economic ministries in Moscow were abolished and replaced by 105 regional economic councils.

Last June several of Khrushchev's colleagues tried to reverse all this.

The reason for the reorganization is readily understandable if one tries to conceive of the bureaucratic mess which we would have if we attempted to manage from the Capital all the details of a growing industrial complex more dispersed geographically than that of the United States and approaching one-half of its size.

There should be eventual economic benefits from the decentralization, but Khrushchev's plan will create as many problems as it solves. A long period of transitional confusion is certain while new administrative command and coordination channels are worked out. In the longer run there is the danger for the Soviet Union that a kind of economic provincialism will develop to threaten the dominance of the central government.

The reason for the bitter fight against this reorganization by many of Khrushchev's colleagues is clear. The decentralization will remove some of the power from the central government in Moscow and transfer it to the provinces. Here only two members of the Presidium are in a position to exercise real influence—Khrushchev, through his control of the party machinery throughout the Soviet Union, and the military, presently represented by Marshal Zhukov.

#### **The Agricultural Problem**

The second issue dividing the Soviet leaders in June last was the agricultural problem, often called the Achilles heel of the Soviet system. Khrushchev has been pressing for ever-increasing areas of state-controlled farmlands, on the pattern of the huge development he had started in the so-called virgin lands east of the Caspian, in order to make good the shortcomings of communism's greatest fiasco—the collectivized farm system. This involves some 80-100 million acres—larger than the entire wheat acreage of the United States.

For many years Soviet emphasis on heavy industry and military strength drained manpower and capital investments away from the farms, making agriculture the stepchild of the Stalinist economy. In contrast with the rapid growth rate of other parts of the Soviet economy, for the past 20 years Soviet production of agricultural commodities has failed to increase as fast as the population of the U.S.S.R.

After all, soil conditions, rainfall, and temperature do not favor the Soviet Union despite its vast area. Less than 10 percent of the country is likely to produce reasonable agricultural yields in normal years. Moreover, the combination of bureaucratic mismanagement and Communist neglect of the motivating force of personal incentives has resulted in an inefficiency of farm labor so great that it takes about one farm worker to feed and supply every four persons in the



U.S.S.R., whereas the ratio in the United States is about 1 for every 16 persons. Hence, 45 percent of Soviet labor is on the farms as compared with 10 percent of American workers.

Khrushchev's responsibility for the policy of investing heavily in the semiarid, agriculturally marginal virgin lands is very great. So far he has been lucky, with one excellent crop and one fair one. This year, 1957, promises to be only fair, and there is no doubt that many Soviet leaders fear a major crop failure as the moisture is used up in the new lands. Even Mikoyan, who has stuck with Khrushchev so far and now is probably the number-two man in the party, is said to have been dubious about the virgin-lands program.

The final success or failure of the program is still to be determined, and Khrushchev's personal reputation is deeply involved. He has promised his people equality per capita with Americans in milk and butter by 1958 and in meat by 1961. This latter would involve an increase of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  times in Soviet meat production, which, to say the least, is an ambitious program, even taking into account the noted fertility of the rabbit, which is included in the Soviet calculations, as well as their claimed ability to produce a larger number of twin lambs.

#### Soviet Foreign Policy

Finally, a third point at issue between Khrushchev and his opponents lay in the related fields of foreign policy and policy toward the European satellites. Here Khrushchev was attacked by Molotov and his followers for having weakened the Soviet position by his policy of reconciliation with Yugoslavia and by his Austrian settlement. He was, in fact, vulnerable to the charge of having opened the flood gates to revolt by stimulating support for the doctrine of "differing roads to socialism," a heresy that is now threatening the monolithic structure of the Soviet empire.

For a time during the Hungarian revolution the ranks in the Soviet leadership had closed, and Khrushchev personally as well as his opponents must bear the responsibility for the ruthless intervention in November 1956. The scars of dissent remained, however, and in the indictment of Molotov by the Central Committee his Yugoslav and Austrian policies are the subject of particular criticism. Hungary goes unmentioned.

Moscow's future policy toward the European satellites remains unresolved. Though Molotov

was vigorously attacked for his mistaken attitude, Khrushchev, since the Polish and Hungarian revolts, has feared the contagious influence of granting more freedom anywhere. Certainly none of the Soviet leaders cares to remember the precepts of Lenin, who had this to say in 1917:

If Finland, if Poland, if the Ukraine break away from Russia there is nothing bad about that. . . . No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations.

These were the major issues on which Khrushchev fought for, and by an eyelash won, the leadership of the Soviet Union.

There are many other burning problems facing the new group ruling the Soviet Union.

#### East-West Contacts

First of all, they have the problem of East-West contacts, which, for propaganda purposes at least, they strongly claim to favor. Can the leaders really permit the people of the U.S.S.R. to have knowledge of the facts of life? Do they dare open up to the press, to radio, to television?

Except for certain supervised and guided tours, the answer to this so far seems to be "no." We can guess how frightened they are from their panicky warnings to Soviet youth about being deceived by the words of the American boys and girls who went to Moscow recently for the big Soviet youth festival.

Similarly, they do not dare publish such documents as the Khrushchev secret speech, the U.N. report on Hungary, nor the basic attack on Communist doctrine by the Yugoslav, Djilas, in his recently published book, *The New Class*.

Instead of dealing with such criticisms openly, Soviet leaders try to sweep them under the rug and keep their own people in the dark.

There was recently published in Moscow a highly realistic novel with the eloquent title *Not By Bread Alone*. It evoked great popular interest in the U.S.S.R. because it showed some of the seamier side of political life and bureaucracy in the Soviet Union today. All the big guns of the Soviet regime began to fire at the author, Dudintsev, and Khrushchev himself recently lambasted the book as misguided and dangerous. It is significant that they have not yet banned it. Probably they were too late in realizing its subtle attack on the foundations of the Communist system.

By and large the bulk of the Russian people



still live in a dream world about everything outside the U.S.S.R., and the most tragic part about this is the distorted facts and fancies the Soviet leaders give their own people about the allegedly hostile attitudes of Americans toward them. The exchange of a few controlled traveling delegations is not enough. The barriers to information and knowledge must be torn down.

### Intellectual Unrest

The Soviet leaders also have to deal with the problems created by their own educational system and by the development of an industrial and technical elite. Under the lash of its pellmell industrialization program the U.S.S.R. in the past decade has enormously speeded up the education of the Russian people, particularly in the scientific and technical field. As a result, the U.S.S.R. is turning out hundreds of thousands of graduates of schools corresponding to our high schools and colleges.

It is true that in their educational system they emphasize scientific and technical fields much more than social sciences and the humanities. But knowledge is not an inert substance. It has a way of seeping across lines and into adjacent compartments of learning. The Soviet leaders, I firmly believe, cannot illuminate their scientific lecture halls and laboratories without also letting the light of truth into their history and economics classrooms. Students cannot be conditioned to turning off their analytical processes when the instructor changes a topic.

Student and intellectual unrest is a troublesome challenge to a dictatorship. The Chinese Communists experimented briefly with placating critics by liberalizing their thought-control system—enunciating the doctrine known as “let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend.” In the face of the far-reaching criticisms promptly voiced by Chinese intellectuals, the Peiping regime quickly reversed itself and has only a few weeks ago resumed the practice of publicly executing students who dared to suggest that China’s ills result in part from flaws in the Communist system itself.

The education which Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders give their people is a dangerous commodity for a dictatorship. Men and women who have their critical faculties sharpened are beginning to question why the Russian people can-

not be freed from rigid Communist Party and police-state discipline, given a greater economic share of the fruit of their labors, and allowed to participate—at least by an effective expression of consent—in their own governing.

In the past the Soviets counted particularly upon their ability to appeal with success to the youth and the students. In 1905 Lenin wrote,

We are the party of the future but the future belongs to the young. We are the party of innovation, and it is to the innovators that youth always gladly gives its allegiance. We are the party of self-sacrificing struggle against the ancient rot, and the young are always readiest for sacrificial combat—and we shall always be the party of the youth of the advanced class.

That proud boast could not be made today. The Hungarian students were ready for combat, but *against* the Soviets, not *for* them. The deep disillusionment of the Polish youth with the Soviet-imposed version of communism can be read in their brilliantly edited publications, and in spite of Soviet censorship there is evidence that they are read eagerly by those who can obtain them in the Russian universities.

The Soviet Government can still organize massive propaganda circuses like the recent Moscow youth festival. They can train an ever-increasing number of young scientists and technicians. They can bribe the ambitious with the rewards of power and special privilege in the swollen bureaucracy. But they are finding it increasingly difficult to enlist in their cause the self-sacrificing and idealistic young men that Lenin once so counted on and who are the real motive power of successful revolutionary movements.

The Soviet leaders also have the growing problem of the technical and managerial elite which has been created to run Soviet industry—now being decentralized. It will not be easy to restrain this class of people from using its critical skills to question the cumbersome governmental and Communist Party bureaucracy and what it is doing—or not doing—to give the members of that elite a better life.

Probably it is out of respect for the growing perceptiveness of the people of Russia, and at least out of recognition of popular yearning for peace, that Soviet leaders have been forced to give lip service to disarmament, another grave problem before the Moscow leaders. Now that the issue of conceding some form of inspection and control in the U.S.S.R. is squarely presented,

they are hesitating. This prospect goes against every tradition and instinct of the secretive and suspicious Communist dictators.

These are some of the practical issues which Khrushchev now faces. There is no easy solution. After all, dictatorships, whether of the Stalin or of the Hitler type, can for a time exact great sacrifices from their peoples and achieve great materialistic accomplishments. In fact, for a limited period, it may be easier for a dictatorship to make steel than bread and butter—easier to build a mighty war machine than to satisfy the moral, spiritual, and material needs of a great and diverse people. This is certainly the case with the Communist dictatorship in the U.S.S.R.

Today communism is more valuable as an article of export than it is as a solution for the problems of a country like the Soviet Union, which is making great strides in fields of material progress but which has still found no way of creating a government which can meet the needs and aspirations of its people.

#### **Communism's Appeal in Underdeveloped Areas**

Undoubtedly in many areas of the world, particularly those recently freed from colonial rule, the image of communism still has an appeal. It seems to combine the advantages of strict discipline at the top with the promise of quick industrialization. These factors appeal to new nations struggling with the task of making a government work among peoples who have had little experience with it and who at the same time have the desire to become quickly an industrial force in their own right.

The politically unsophisticated peoples of the underdeveloped nations have yet to learn what the peoples of the Communist world are slowly coming to understand about Marxism and industrial growth. Djilas, the Yugoslav Communist heretic, put it well:

Modern communism began as an idea with the inception of modern industry. It is dying out or being eliminated in those countries where industrial development has achieved its basic purposes. It flourishes in those countries where this has not yet happened.

In fact, I would add to this that the force of ideological communism seems weakest in those countries, like the U.S.S.R., where it has been the

longest in control. It has its strongest appeal to the minds of these peoples in the underdeveloped areas of the world where they have had no practical experience with it.

Viewed in broad perspective, communism is only one of the many great revolutionary movements that have swept into world history. Such movements seemed to combine an ideology or a faith expressed as a program of action and a discipline through a political or military machine capable of organizing the energies of the people in order to carry out the ideas that have captured their imaginations and loyalties.

#### **Analogy With the French Revolution**

I realize that historical analogies are notoriously treacherous. But there may be food for thought in comparing the evolution of Soviet communism with the classical periods of revolutionary movements. Possibly the closest parallel in history is with the French Revolution.

The pattern seems to be this: The intellectuals desert their political institutions and adopt what they call a reform program. Then revolutionary elements take over from the intellectuals and seize power, generally beginning with the moderates of the Danton type and passing through the extremists like Robespierre, with a reign of inhuman zeal and terror. Successive groups of leaders are destroyed with each change in the tempo of the revolution. As Vergniaud said in the course of the French Revolution, "The Revolution, like Saturn, devours its own children." Eventually, human nature rebels and demands a more normal life. Then the practical political and military leaders depose the extremists.

Finally, in the case of the French Revolution, there was the temptation, to which they quickly yielded, to indulge in foreign military adventure and eventually the access to power of the military man on horseback, Bonaparte. There is, naturally, considerable speculation these days as to whether this last phase of the French Revolution will be repeated in the case of Soviet communism. I have no crystal-ball answer, but certainly military dictatorship is one of the possible lines of evolution in the Soviet Union.

From this analysis of developments in the Soviet Union it is fair to conclude that I believe that the old Communist dialectic of Marx, Lenin,

and even Stalin does not answer the problems of the Soviet Union today, either those of its industrial growth or of its lasting control over the great peoples living within the Soviet Union.

It would flow from this that Khrushchev and whomever he may associate with himself in the leadership, assuming he keeps his control for a time, will have to determine how they are going to accomplish this dual task. Will they meet it by further relaxation, thereby increasing the moral and industrial potential of the Soviet Union itself and the prospects of peace but risking the loss of the satellite countries? Will they attempt a reversion to something like Stalinism under another name, as some of the tough, uncompromising language and actions from Moscow of recent days would suggest? Or will they be tempted to risk foreign venture with a view to uniting their people and their energies to meet alleged enemies they claim are encircling them?

#### **Emphasis on Industry and Armament**

These are the issues. I would not wish to suggest that what I have referred to as the decline of the Marxist communism has left the Soviet Union materially weak in facing them. The Soviet may be ideologically less menacing; technologically its power is still increasing.

Throughout the entire revolution, once the Communist regime was firmly established in Russia, the emphasis was placed on heavy industry and on building up the war machine. This has been a constant policy and has been one phase of Soviet life that has not been affected by changing leaders or interpretations of Communist ideology. After all, the men who are at the helm in the Soviet Union are not the original revolutionary heroes. Khrushchev and Mikoyan and their henchmen belong to the ever-present class of political careerists who see in a revolutionary movement the path to power and privilege. They did not make the revolution, like Lenin. It made them, and they want above all else to preserve their positions.

While Marxism at one time or another has invaded most segments of Soviet life, including the army with its political commissar and indoctrination agents, those who have planned the Soviet military buildup have been little hampered by it. In their concentration on the fields of nuclear energy, aircraft design and construction, and the

development of guided missiles, they experienced little ideological interference except during brief periods of Stalin's last hectic days.

Take, for example, the case of guided missiles. Here they never ceased work from the days of 1945, when they took over the German missile installation at Peenemuende with its rockets of a range between 150 to 200 miles. Now we know they have developed modern missiles of many times the power and efficiency of the German war-time models.

#### **Contradictions in the U.S.S.R.**

The Soviet Union which we face today presents a series of contradictions. Its leader has practically unrestrained power except for such control as the military may exercise, backed by a formidable war machine—a leader committed by his expressed policies to improve the lot of his people and presumably committed also to relax the harsh controls of Stalin, which he has described so vividly himself and which he purports to abhor.

At the same time, this leader, Khrushchev, faces the dilemma that any substantial relaxation at home or abroad, given the nature of the Communist dictatorship as it has evolved, may spell his own downfall. For he faces, and he knows it, a people who are questioning the basic tenets of Marxist communism and, in particular, a student body that is becoming more and more vocal in demanding the truth and may not be satisfied with half measures.

The Communist leaders are also facing a growing body of highly educated, technologically competent men and women in the field of industrial management and production. It may prove impossible for them to stop the growing wave of intellectual unrest in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev cannot turn back education or stop technological development and keep the U.S.S.R. a great power.

Yet Khrushchev seems to be in a hurry to solve a whole series of such problems as I have described and gain the personal success necessary to maintain his own position.

In addition to all this, he has deeply committed himself in certain foreign adventures, particularly in the Middle East—partly, it may be assumed, to distract attention from problems at home and in the satellites. All this rightfully makes us

cautious in our judgments and does not suggest that there are any quick or easy ways out in our relations with the U.S.S.R.

But over the longer range we can rest assured that revolutionary Communist tyranny cannot provide a final answer or a satisfactory answer to the needs of a civilized community. No power on earth can restore the myth that communism is the wave of the future, after 10 million Hungarians, after a decade of experience with it and at the risk of their lives, gave it such a resounding vote of "no confidence."

The people of Russia, if given the time to continue their evolution to freedom out of the narrow bounds of Communist dictatorship, will themselves help to find a peaceful answer.

### U.S.-Yugoslav Economic Talks

Press release 559 dated October 4

Representatives of the Yugoslav Government headed by Yugoslav State Secretary for Finance, Mr. Avdo Humo, following a preliminary meeting with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, have conferred for the past several days with United States officials headed by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Mr. C. Douglas Dillon. The discussions covered the whole range of United States-Yugoslav economic relations and have contributed to a clearer understanding on the part of both Governments of economic problems of mutual interest.

During the course of the discussions the Yugoslav representatives reviewed the efforts and steps being taken by the Yugoslav Government to resolve certain long-term problems of the Yugoslav economy and to create conditions for a further integration on a multilateral basis of the Yugoslav economy with the world economy. A number of Yugoslav economic development projects, which are now being planned, were described. The continuing need of Yugoslavia for imported food-stuffs was also outlined.

The United States representatives agreed to give further study to the development projects described by Yugoslav representatives. It was also agreed that negotiations for the sale of United States surplus agricultural commodities under Public Law 480 would be undertaken shortly between United States and Yugoslav officials in Belgrade.

### Meeting of ANZUS Council

Press release 558 dated October 4

The ANZUS Council met in Washington October 4, 1957. The Right Honorable Richard G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs, represented Australia; the Honorable Thomas L. Macdonald, Minister of External Affairs, represented New Zealand; and the Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, represented the United States.

This meeting was one of a regular series in which the Council members discuss implementation of the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States which was signed at San Francisco on September 1, 1951.<sup>1</sup> The Council, established under the terms of the treaty, provides a forum in which the Foreign Ministers of the three governments can, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, further the mutual objective of strengthening their relationships in matters pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Ministers reviewed events affecting the three countries since their last Council meeting on November 17, 1956.<sup>2</sup> In addition to a general exchange of views on major world problems, the representatives specifically expressed their belief that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, to which all three nations adhere, will continue to make a significant contribution to the security and well-being of Southeast Asia.

The delegations also included, for Australia: Sir Percy Spender, the Ambassador to the United States; Lieutenant General Sir Henry Wells, Chief of the General Staff; and Mr. Arthur Tange, Secretary, Department of External Affairs; for New Zealand: Mr. G. D. L. White, Counselor of the Embassy of New Zealand in the United States; Major General C. E. Weir, Chief of the General Staff; and Mr. George R. Laking, Deputy Secretary of External Affairs; and for the United States: Mr. Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State; Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State; Mr. G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor, Department of State; Mr. Mansfield Sprague, Assistant Secretary of Defense; and Admiral Felix B. Stump, Commander-in-Chief Pacific.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 148.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Nov. 26, 1956, p. 839.



## Cooperation in International Economic Affairs

by Willard L. Beaulac  
*Ambassador to Argentina*<sup>1</sup>

I have been in the Foreign Service long enough to have reminiscences, and I thought it might be of interest to review some of the changes that I have observed in our Government's attitude toward international economic affairs since I entered the Foreign Service several years ago.

In the early twenties the emphasis in international economic matters was on what we called protection of American interests. There was no Export-Import Bank, there was no International Bank. Trade and banking were carried out entirely by private concerns.

Our Government tried through treaties to obtain fair, nondiscriminatory treatment for American interests. Once in a great while it negotiated a commercial treaty with a foreign government. Treaties tended to stay in effect a long time, and in between there was very little to do in the way of negotiation. During the interim our relations with foreign governments in the international economic field had to do principally with the protection of private interests, which meant the protection of the interests of private persons and firms.

Protection sometimes took the form of collecting bills from governments. If a private firm sold goods to a foreign government or entered into a contract with it and the foreign government did not pay, then our Government was asked to collect the bill and frequently it did so, or at least it tried to do so. The bill-collecting business was pretty brisk in certain parts of the world.

Rivalry was the keynote in international economic relations in the twenties. Our traders competed with the traders of other countries, and our

Government's agents abroad were supposed to help them in this job. None of us in those days would have thought it possible that we would some day help to build up the economic strength of countries like Germany and Japan so that they could give us stiff competition in the international economic field.

Within this economic rivalry emphasis was on exports. The idea was to sell as much as you could and buy as little as you could. That produced what was fondly known as a favorable balance of trade. The Department of Commerce of the United States spent millions of dollars of the taxpayers' money helping exporters to sell goods that other countries couldn't pay for. Private banks sold bonds to American investors to provide loans which foreign countries couldn't repay.

This process ended in the late twenties and the early thirties with worldwide economic depression.

### Cooperation in the Twenties

Even in the twenties we had a kind of elementary system of cooperation with other countries of the type now commonly known as "point 4." Our Government helped countries to build roads. The automobile producers, for some reason, seemed to be the principal supporters of this kind of activity. We helped countries to improve their public health on the theory that mosquitoes and other menaces to health don't respect frontiers and that public health, therefore, is a common problem.

We also helped certain countries to reorganize their finances. This last was a part of what became known as dollar diplomacy. Dollar diplomacy was criticized by a great number of people, but it contained the germ of a good idea which later produced the Export-Import Bank and

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Chamber of Commerce at Buenos Aires on Sept. 30.



other similar phenomena which have become common and are today accepted without reservation.

When point 4 became a part of our diplomacy, little attention was given to financial matters. We lent technical assistance in such fields as public health, agriculture, and vocational education; but the field of fiscal policy was left untouched.

During the last few years we have come to realize that in many cases fiscal policy lies at the bottom of the troubles of some of the countries with which we want to have cooperative relations and which want to have cooperative relations with us. The phenomenon of inflation and its unfortunate results in hindering economic development or in distorting the development that does take place has become all too common. It looks as though helping other countries to reorganize their finances was not a bad idea. (Some people seem to think that reorganizing our own finances would not be a bad idea either!)

It is more and more recognized today that economic development depends basically on three things: sound fiscal policies, efficient development of natural and human resources, and profitable international trade. That seems to be the secret of success in the economic field, and the fine thing about it, of course, is that it's no secret at all.

The Export-Import Bank was founded in the thirties in order to finance exports. It was an instrument to help bring about our own economic recovery and to help bring about the economic recovery of other countries. Its principal activity continues to be the financing of exports, and it has grown to be a very important and even an indispensable instrument of economic cooperation because it has provided financing for economic development in other countries which, in many or most cases, was not available from any other source. The United States, of course, as a member and as a source of dollar financing, also has had a very prominent part, as we know, in the operations of the International Bank.

Our reciprocal trade agreements program constituted a very important step in the liberalization of our international trade. Today two-thirds of our imports from Latin America enter the United States duty free. The average duty on the remainder is less than 10 percent. This remains one of our greatest contributions to the economic development of other countries and, of course, to our own economic development.

Today the Foreign Service spends very little of its time on what used to be known as protection of American interests. Rivalry in the international economic field still exists, of course, but it has been subordinated to cooperation. There is nearly universal recognition in the free world that the prosperity of one country is directly related to the prosperity of other countries. We know now that we cannot sell unless we buy. Indeed, the need to buy in order to produce adequately for domestic consumption has become more and more evident.

In the circumstances the Foreign Service is concerned more with the protection of the general interest of the United States and of the countries with which the United States wishes to cooperate than it is with the protection of individual private interests. It is concerned more with helping to create conditions in which all free countries can develop their economies, conditions which we have come to recognize are basic to the prosperity of all our countries.

#### **Fair Treatment for Private Capital**

We still try to impress upon foreign governments the desirability of fair and equitable treatment of American private interests; but the emphasis today is on the generally recognized principle that economic development and improvement of living standards, with reference to which our cooperation as a nation is frequently solicited, must be effected principally by private capital and private capital can operate efficiently and helpfully only if it is given fair and equitable treatment.

Engineer Rodolfo Martinez, former Minister of Commerce and Industry of Argentina, has explained the new situation in words difficult to improve upon. In his address to the second plenary session of the recent economic conference, Engineer Martinez, speaking as representative of the Pan American Union of Engineers, said,

Private enterprise, national or foreign, needs the faith of the people and the respect of the country, the guaranty of the law, the inviolability of its rights, security for its profits, and assurance of justice. Treaties between nations are not the important thing. Private capital responds to stimulus and confidence; every country is free within its political, economic, or social philosophy to open its doors or to close them. Each country has the right to legislate and defend its interests. Happily the day is long past when the country where investments originated

could rattle its arms in order to influence a government; but this circumstance creates a great responsibility. Solution of the economic problem for that very reason depends on the country's own conduct.

#### **U.S. as Government and as Banker**

The fact that the Government of the United States, through the Export-Import Bank and through other instruments, has assumed such an active role in the economic development of other countries naturally makes our relations with other countries much more complicated than they used to be. It means that our Government in the international field acts not only as a government but as a banker, and frequently the two roles are confused in the public mind.

For example, we are continually being told by other governments and by the press and public in other countries that we should do things in the economic field that would produce certain results, or that it is hoped would produce certain results, in other countries. These suggestions frequently are not addressed to the Government of the United States as government but to the Government of the United States as banker. This sometimes creates awkward situations for the United States as government because what the United States as banker can do in another country depends on what that country, itself, is doing in the economic field. On the other hand, we are inhibited by tradition from making public suggestions concerning what other countries should do within their own borders because if we made such suggestions we would appear to a great many people to be making them as government. The distinction between the United States as government and the United States as banker would not be clear. We would appear to be on the narrow edge of intervention, in other words.

This is only one of many complications which characterize our international relations today. Traditions which grew up under vastly different circumstances persist in newer circumstances. Adjustment takes time.

There is no acceptable alternative to the kind of cooperative relationship which has grown up naturally out of the troubled history of the last three decades. Certainly we will never return to a philosophy of trying to sell without buying. Few people will argue in the days to come that our prosperity and our tranquillity are not directly

related to the prosperity and tranquillity of other areas of the world, and few in any country will argue that any of us can live by himself.

However, the fact that few people will argue in those terms does not mean that many will not act as though we could, in fact, live by ourselves, and it is here that it seems to me that our American Chambers of Commerce abroad can be especially helpful.

Our Government is committed to a policy of liberalism in the international economic field, but the extent to which it can carry out that policy depends on the support it receives from the citizenry. It seems to me that if I were a private citizen and a member of a Chamber of Commerce abroad, I would take very careful note every time I heard of an effort being made by a pressure group to cause the Government of the United States to act as though our prosperity and our security were unrelated to the prosperity and security of other people, as though we could sell without buying, as though we didn't live in an interdependent world, as though we had learned nothing during the last 30 years.

I would take note of this and give thought to what, as an individual and as a member of the chamber, I could do about it, certain in my mind that, if that group should succeed in placing its immediate interests above the interests of the United States, the first victims would be me and my associates in the Chamber of Commerce and the next victims would be my fellow citizens at home.

Countries, like parents, influence others more by example than by preachment. As in the case of parents, that example isn't always of the best.

Shakespeare explained the problem when he said, "If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches, and poor men's cottages princes' palaces."

We would not want all our churches converted into cathedrals or our homes into princes' palaces. The upkeep would be excessive, and I know from experience in Buenos Aires that living in a prince's palace is not all that it's cracked up to be, although I hasten to add that I am not complaining.

The liberal road is not an easy one to follow, but we know from experience that it is the only road that leads to economic improvement.

## World Bank Loan to Ecuador for Road Construction

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced on September 20 that it had that day made a loan of \$14.5 million to Ecuador for the construction of four key roads and a 4-year road maintenance program. Improved transportation is a prerequisite to Ecuador's further economic growth, and measures now being taken by the Government to improve the national road network can be expected to have far-reaching effects.

At present the national highway network totals 2,000 miles of primary and secondary roads, of which only 200 miles are asphalted, 430 miles are cobblestone, and the rest are gravel roads in poor condition because of lack of maintenance. Under the program now being undertaken maintenance operations will be completely reorganized to provide Ecuador with an organization staffed and equipped to carry out effective maintenance of these roads. District maintenance centers will be set up, workshops and warehouses will be established, new equipment will be purchased, and a training program for the operation and maintenance of the equipment will be carried out. The program will improve the condition of most of the national network and save the Government the costly alternative of rebuilding roads.

The four new roads to be built will open up large areas of Ecuador's fertile but unexploited coastland, and one of them will make possible all-weather motor transport between the populous mountain area around Quito, the Capital, and the tropical coastal region. The roads will have a total length of 330 miles. The longest of them, 145 miles, will provide a vital link in an all-weather road between Quito and Guayaquil, Ecuador's largest city and chief port. The stretch from Guayaquil and Quevedo, where the new road will start, has already been put in good condition partly with the help of a bank loan of \$8.5 million made in 1954 for road improvements in the Providence of Guayas. The new road will run from Quevedo to Quito via St. Domingo and Aloag. It will traverse flat, rolling country at a low altitude over most of its length and will then climb 10,500 feet through the lowest pass in the Andes on down to Quito at about 9,000 feet. It will open up presently inaccessible fertile land be-

tween Quevedo and St. Domingo, suitable for the cultivation of bananas and cacao.

The second road runs from Duran, a town opposite Guayaquil on the Guayas River, to Cochancay at the foothills of the Andes. It forms part of the highway connection between Guayaquil and Cuenca, Ecuador's third largest town. The work to be undertaken on this road is mainly reconstruction. A paved all-weather road in this area will reduce the losses in spoilage now incurred in transporting agricultural crops, particularly bananas, to Guayaquil for export and reduce motor-vehicle operating costs. It will be the main artery for branch roads now being built in other parts of Guayas Province, among them, bank-financed roads.

A third road, of 30 miles, will be built from Chone to Bahia de Caraquez, a port town on the Pacific. When this road is completed, agricultural export products from the Chone area can be transported directly to the port of Bahia in all seasons of the year.

The fourth road, of 100 miles, from Chone to St. Domingo, will be constructed when work on the others and on the maintenance program has progressed satisfactorily. It would pass through fertile but for the most part uncultivated land and through its connection with the Chone-Bahia road would provide the coastal hinterland with an access to the sea.

## Julius C. Holmes To Tour African Continent

Press release 557 dated October 4

Julius C. Holmes, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, will leave Washington on October 6 for a 10-week tour of the African Continent. He plans to visit American diplomatic and consular offices to study and prepare a detailed report for the Secretary of State on this increasingly important continent. He will be accompanied on his tour by Charles N. Manning, who, as Executive Director for African Affairs, is responsible for administrative matters affecting U.S. posts in Africa.

Prior to his assignment as Special Assistant to Secretary Dulles, Mr. Holmes served at various times as Diplomatic Agent in charge of the U.S. Legation in Morocco, Assistant Secretary of State, and Minister at the American Embassy at London.

During World War II he served in the U.S. Army, attaining the rank of brigadier general.

Following is Mr. Holmes' itinerary:

<i>City</i>	<i>Arrival Date</i>
Paris, France	October 7
Dakar, French West Africa	October 9
Monrovia, Liberia	October 12
Abidjan, Ivory Coast, French West Africa	October 17
Accra, Ghana	October 20
Lagos, Nigeria	October 24
Douala, French Cameroons	October 27
Yaoundé, French Cameroons	October 28
Douala	October 29
Brazzaville (French Equatorial Africa)	October 30
and Leopoldville (Belgian Congo)	
Johannesburg, South Africa	November 2
Durban, South Africa	November 7
Lourenço Marques, Mozambique	November 9
Tananarive, Madagascar	November 11
Salisbury, South Rhodesia	November 13
Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika	November 16
Nairobi, Kenya	November 18
Mogadiscio, Italian Somaliland	November 21
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	November 23
Khartoum, Sudan	November 27
Benghazi, Libya	November 28
Tripoli, Libya	December 3
Tunis, Tunisia	December 9
Casablanca, Morocco	December 11
Rabat, Morocco	December 12
Tangier, Morocco	December 13
Paris	December 14
New York	December 16

## President Decides Not To Reopen Escape-Clause Action on Watch Tariff

White House press release dated October 4

The President has concurred with the United States Tariff Commission's recent finding that no formal investigation should be instituted at this time to determine whether the tariff should be reduced on imports of watches. The President found, with the Tariff Commission, that there is not sufficient reason at this time to reopen the escape-clause action which resulted 2 years ago in an increase in the duty on imports of watches.<sup>1</sup> The President's decision means that the increased rate of duty established in July 1954 as the result of escape-clause action will continue to apply without reduction or other modification.

The President's action was taken after various departments and agencies of the executive branch

had been consulted. The Tariff Commission's study was made pursuant to Executive Order 10401, which requires periodic review of affirmative actions taken under the escape clause. This was the Tariff Commission's second such periodic review of the 1954 watch-tariff increase. The Commission's report was submitted to the President on July 25, 1957.<sup>2</sup>

## Journalists From NATO Countries Visit United States

The Department of State announced on September 30 (press release 549) that 11 journalists from 9 member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were arriving in Washington that day to commence a month-long coast-to-coast tour of the United States. They have been invited to visit this country under the International Educational Exchange Program of the Department of State as a means of promoting a better understanding abroad of the American people and policies of the U.S. Government. Their visit is intended to develop a better understanding on the part of the American people of their NATO allies.

The Governmental Affairs Institute is cooperating with the Department of State in planning the program of activities for the visiting journalists. Numerous state and municipal officials and private citizens throughout the country are assisting in making local arrangements and providing hospitality to the newsmen. The countries represented by those in the group are Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

The group will spend several days in the Capital, where their activities will include briefings by various officials of the Departments of State and Defense. From Washington they will make a trip to Williamsburg, Va., and from there will go on to Louisville, Ky., to remain until October 10. Other cities on their itinerary include Lubbock, Tex. (October 10-15); Seattle, Wash. (October 15-18); San Francisco, Calif. (October 18-21); Denver, Colo. (October 21-25); and New York, N. Y. (October 25-29). They will leave New York on October 29 to return to their home countries.

<sup>2</sup> Copies of the Commission's report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D.C.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of July 18, 1955, p. 113.



## United Nations Moves To Reduce U.S. Share of Assessments

*Statements by A. S. J. Carnahan*

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*

### STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 30<sup>1</sup>

I am very pleased to be here and to undertake consideration of the items on our agenda with such distinguished colleagues. Although this is the first General Assembly in which I have participated as a member of the United States delegation, I have followed with keen interest the work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies for a number of years. I serve as a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and that committee, of course, deals with considerable detail with United States participation in international organizations.

I have not previously had the privilege of discussing this question of the scale of assessments in the Fifth Committee. However, as a member of the United States Congress, I am somewhat familiar with past discussions concerning the United Nations scale of assessments. At the very outset I want to make clear the concern I feel because of the decision taken on this question at last year's General Assembly session<sup>2</sup> and the seriousness with which I urge your support for the proposal which the United States has tabled this year.<sup>3</sup>

Most of the members of this committee, I am told, have served here for many years. Accordingly, there is no need for me to attempt to give a detailed history of the consideration of the scale-of-assessment question. I believe, however, that it will be helpful if I attempt to summarize as

briefly as possible the background of the United States proposal.

### Background of U.S. Proposal

In the first Assembly session in 1946 it was decided that contributions of members to the regular budget of the organization should be based broadly on capacity to pay. The use of the word "broadly" was a recognition of the fact that capacity to pay could not be the sole criterion in fixing all assessments.

In that very first session much thought was given to the question of how to fix the contribution of the highest contributor, since it quickly became evident that application of a capacity-to-pay principle alone would produce a result which was absurd. It was estimated at that time that the capacity to pay of the United States was about 60 percent relative to that of the total capacity of other members. The Contributions Committee recognized that in an organization of this kind no state should be permitted to exercise an influence which would inevitably be attached to a financial contribution of 60 percent of the budget, and so it proposed a United States assessment of 49.89 percent.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who then represented the United States, urged a reconsideration of the proposal of the Contributions Committee and made the following statement, which I believe was eminently sound and which represents the position of the United States:

This is *not* a question as to what we can afford to pay. We—and you—can *afford to pay* anything, in material values, to achieve the goals of the United Nations. This

<sup>1</sup> Made in Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary) on Sept. 30 (U. S. delegation press release 2745).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 24 and 31, 1956, p. 197.

<sup>3</sup> U. N. doc. A/C.5/L.458.

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is, with us, solely a question of what is *right* and *wise* and just as between partners in this common enterprise.

Upon the further consideration requested by Senator Vandenberg, the Assembly decided to fix the initial assessment of the United States at 39.89 percent. This decision recognized the fact that the fixing of the maximum contribution of any one state in an organization of sovereign states was largely an arbitrary matter for which there was no fixed formula. It recognized the fact that, although, of course, capacity to pay was one important consideration in making such a determination, so also was the size of the membership; that is, the total number of members of the organization, and the fact of their sovereign equality.

In 1948, when this organization had 58 members, the General Assembly took a further step and recognized that in normal times, that is, when there had been a recovery from the results of the last great war, no one state should pay an assessment of more than one-third of the ordinary expenses of the organization. The principle thus recognized did not become effective, however, until January 1, 1954, when the organization had grown to a membership of 60.

Then in 1955 came a very important new development. Sixteen new members were admitted to the United Nations. This was an increase in membership of more than 25 percent. The assessment percentages of new members were fixed by the Contributions Committee in the spring of 1956, and a decision then had to be taken at the last General Assembly concerning the incorporation of these percentages into the 100 percent scale of assessments. The United States believed that these new contributions totaling 6.36 percent would be incorporated into the scale of assessments by giving *pro rata* percentage reductions to all member states. It seemed clear to the United States that, if the scale of assessments was equitable in 1955, when it was approved by the Assembly, then only a *pro rata* reduction to all member states would insure that the scale remained equitable. Accordingly, the United States Government was very much concerned when the Contributions Committee recommended, and the Assembly decided, that the United States should be excluded from the *pro rata* reductions given to all other member states except those paying a minimum percentage. This appeared to us to be a reversal of the policies which had governed

General Assembly action in this matter from the beginning. What had always been considered as a ceiling of 33½ percent on the contribution of the highest contributor was now considered to be in reality a *floor* regardless of how many members the United Nations had.

We do not believe this was the intention of the General Assembly when it passed resolution 238 (III) in 1948, which stated that the Assembly "accepts the principle of a *ceiling* to be fixed on the percentage rate of contributions of the Member State bearing the highest assessment." In 1952, in resolution 665 (VII), the Assembly decided "that from 1 January 1954 the assessment of the largest contributor shall not *exceed* one-third of total assessments against Members."

This, Mr. Chairman, is one of the reasons the United States delegation at the 11th session of the General Assembly pressed so insistently for a debate on this issue at the opening of this session. We believe it is essential that this point be clarified.

The basic principle accepted as early as 1948 was that no one member should pay a preponderant share. We continue to subscribe to that principle. We maintain that its application as expressed in a specific figure may vary from time to time and is open to discussion when there are material changes in the total situation. We believe that, when the Assembly established 33½ percent as a ceiling on the maximum contribution, it left to the future the possibility of reducing the assessment of the largest contributor below that maximum, as circumstances warranted. As you all know, there was little change in membership between 1948 and 1955, and therefore little reason to consider a change in the maximum assessment for one member.

I know that all governments and all representatives in the Fifth Committee have a strong desire to decrease financial contributions when possible. I, as a member of the United States Congress, can understand why other governments desired as large a reduction as possible in their percentage contributions last year, but I must say frankly I find it difficult to understand a decision which ignored the language of resolutions 238 (III) and 665 (VII) and excluded the United States from any reduction.

I want to make it very clear that I recognize that the Contributions Committee and govern-

ments which supported the recommendation of that Committee acted in good faith. Nevertheless, I am convinced that last year's decision overlooked a number of important considerations in the situation.

In view of what I have said, you may have the impression that the United States intends now to challenge or attempt to upset last year's decision. This is not the case. We accepted that decision, although most reluctantly, last year and are now looking only to the future. I have discussed the past—perhaps not as briefly as either you or I hoped—only for the purpose of placing our present proposal in proper focus.

#### Four Primary Principles

When last year the United States proposed that the Fifth Committee should reexamine the principles governing the scale of assessment, a number of delegations may have feared that we wanted to reopen and reexamine all of the principles which have been used in setting the assessment scale and perhaps to revise many of them. This is not what we had in mind then or have in mind now. We consider that there are four primary principles which are used in determining the scale of assessment. These are as follows:

1. Contributions should be based *broadly* on capacity to pay, as measured by national income statistics, with adjustments for countries with low per capita incomes.
2. There should be a ceiling on the maximum contribution of any one state. Since January 1, 1954, the ceiling has been 33.33 percent.
3. No country should contribute at a higher per capita rate than the largest contributor.
4. There should be a floor under the minimum contribution.

No one country shall contribute less than .04 percent. We are concerned here *only* with the ceiling principle. We propose no modifications in the other principles of assessment I have mentioned.

In considering the present United States proposal, it should be noted that this year we are faced, first of all, with the necessity of instructing the Contributions Committee how to proceed in establishing a scale of assessment for 1958. Our principal problem concerns what instructions to give that Committee with respect to the contributions of the six new members, which must

be incorporated into the 100 percent scale. We cannot be certain, but I believe that we are substantially correct in assuming that these percentage contributions will total between 2.1 and 2.5 percent.

We are also faced this year with the problem of instructing the Contributions Committee how to proceed in establishing a scale of assessment for the 3-year period subsequent to 1958. The Committee, after meeting this October to consider the 1958 scale, will presumably meet next spring to make a complete review of the scale and propose a new scale for 1959 and subsequent years. Thus we must decide at this session what guidance should be given to the Contributions Committee as to the interpretation and application of the principles which they must take into consideration.

At the last session of the General Assembly the United States delegation gave notice in this Committee that at this session it would press for a decision that the ceiling on the maximum contribution of any one member should be reduced from 33.33 percent to 30 percent. The United States proposal which is before you is designed to accomplish this.

In the informal discussions of this matter which I have had with other delegations, I find that perhaps the United States has not yet succeeded in making completely clear exactly why it is making this proposal. Several delegates have said to me that the United States cannot possibly be interested only in the saving of about 1.5 million dollars, which would occur when and if this proposal is fully implemented. I can confirm that they are right. Important as is this amount of money to any government, including that of the United States, it is clear that the United States could save that amount if absolutely necessary by reducing its many voluntary contributions to multilateral programs or by making a relatively small cut in one of its bilateral programs. As Senator Vandenberg said in 1946, and Ambassador Lodge said here last year,<sup>4</sup> this is not a question of how much the United States can afford to pay. This is a question of principle.

#### Sharing Responsibilities

The basic reason for our proposal is the fact that, since January 1954, 22 new members have

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 24 and 31, 1956, p. 1001.

been admitted to this organization. This is an increase of more than 35 percent. The United States is now one of 82 members instead of one of 60 members. There is now a broader representation of the world's peoples. We welcome this. We believe that this should strengthen the organization. But—and we believe this sincerely—it will strengthen the organization only if this broader representation is accompanied by a broader sharing of responsibilities. Last year's resolution was a step in the opposite direction; namely, an increase in the concentration of financial responsibility in the United States, since it kept the United States share at 33⅓ percent while it spread the other 66⅔ percent among the balance of the membership, including the 16 new members.

We agree completely with what our distinguished Secretary-General has said in his annual report<sup>5</sup> concerning the nature of the United Nations. This is not a super state, but it is an organization in which 82 sovereign states have the right to express their views and to make these views effective by voting on an equal basis. We also agree with the Secretary-General that we cannot realistically state that certain states are responsible and that others are not. We *all* know that membership in this organization carries great responsibility for each of us. We *all* know too that, in an organization of equals, responsibility is not compatible with too great reliance on any one member. There is no question but that shifting financial burdens to another tends to dilute responsibility. We do not think it is in the best interests of this organization with its greatly increased membership for it to continue to rely, in connection with its regular budgetary expenses, as heavily upon any one member as it has in the past. Even less is it in the interest of the organization to reduce the financial responsibility of all save the maximum contributor so that relatively greater reliance is placed on that contributor than formerly.

Now, I am the first to agree that, just as membership in an organization on an equal basis carries responsibility, so also does material wealth carry responsibility. The United States has been greatly blessed and has prospered through the energies and efforts of its peoples, who have come here from all over the globe. Accordingly it has great responsibilities, and I think that any objec-

tive observer will conclude that the United States has recognized these. The United States has made, and is continuing to make, large voluntary contributions to the programs of the United Nations and its agencies. It is, for example, contributing at a 70 percent rate to the program designed to aid the Palestine refugees. You all also know, I believe, of the *billions* of dollars—not *millions*, but *billions*—which the United States has expended voluntarily in bilateral aid programs all over the world.

I have said all this—perhaps at too great length—only to make clear that the United States position which is incorporated in the proposal before you is one of principle. We think that this proposal is designed in the best interests of the organization.

#### Provisions of Draft Resolution

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss the provisions of the draft resolution which the United States has tabled.

It will be noted that the first five preambular paragraphs are historical, and I assume that there will be no objection to these. The sixth preambular paragraph incorporates a principle which I have already discussed at some length and which has been followed implicitly by the Assembly from the beginning in fixing the maximum contribution of any one member state.

Turning to operative paragraph (a), it will be noted that this embodies a decision in principle that the maximum contribution of any one member state to the regular budget of the United Nations should not exceed 30 percent of the total. This first operative paragraph thus provides for a decrease of 3.33 percent in the maximum contribution of any single member state. We believe that this is an equitable proposal, particularly when it is recognized that the membership of the organization has increased by more than 35 percent since the maximum contribution percentage was fixed at 33.33 percent. It is also equitable in light of the fact that the contributions of 22 member states admitted to the United Nations since January 1, 1954, will total in the neighborhood of 9 percent. Further, it is equitable in light of the fact that subparagraph 2 of operative paragraph (c) makes clear that the reduction of the percentage contribution of the highest contributor to 30 percent will not be completed until some-

<sup>5</sup> U.N. doc. A/3594 and Add. 1.

time in the future when this is made possible by the admission of additional new members or by increases in the national income of the present members.

Operative paragraph (b) is intended to make clear that the scale of assessments for 1956 and 1957 shall remain as fixed by this Committee last year and that the contributions of the six new members admitted during those years be treated as miscellaneous income for those years.

Turning now to operative paragraph (c), delegates will note that subparagraph 1 provides instructions to the Contributions Committee concerning the establishment of the assessment scale for 1958. It provides that the Contributions Committee shall fix the assessment percentages of the six new members and incorporate them into the 100 percent scale. It provides that this incorporation shall be accomplished by applying the total amount of the percentage contributions of these six newly admitted states to a reduction in the percentage contribution of the highest contributor and to consequential reductions in the percentage contributions of member states affected by the *per capita* principle. This means that, in the 1958 scale, the United States will probably receive a reduction in its assessment percentage of approximately 2 percent.

The final sentence in subparagraph 1 of the operative paragraph (c) is important since it makes very clear that this subparagraph will not result in the increase of the contributions of any member state for the year 1958.

Subparagraph 2 of the operative paragraph (c) provides guidance for the Contributions Committee in establishing scales of assessment for years subsequent to 1958. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I wish to amend slightly the last few words of the first sentence of this subparagraph as it appears in A/C.5/L.458. We have noted that the last phrase, reading "because of increases in relative *per capita* income," does not express precisely what we had intended. Accordingly we are amending this phrase by striking out the words "per capita" and substituting the word "national"; thus the last phrase should read "because of increases in relative national income." As thus amended, this subparagraph sets forth the method whereby the maximum contribution of the highest contributor shall be reduced eventually to 30 per-

cent. It provides that this shall be done only when new members are admitted or when the Contributions Committee finds substantial increases in the national income of present member states which might necessitate an increase in their percentage contribution. Thus, the method set forth permits the reduction of the maximum contribution of any one state to 30 percent without requiring increases in the contributions of any other member state. The last sentence of subparagraph 2 spells out this principle clearly so that there should be no misunderstanding on this point in the mind of anyone.

Mr. Chairman, I know that this has been a long and detailed explanation of our proposal. I think you must realize how strongly the United States feels about this problem.

We in the United States believe wholeheartedly in the United Nations. We believe that it is a reasonable, just body which will give careful examination to a problem and come up with a reasonable and equitable solution. I ask for this same careful consideration of the proposal which we have placed before you, in the belief that you will find it is reasonable and equitable.

#### STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 9<sup>a</sup>

When, at our last meeting, the United States delegation accepted important amendments proposed by a number of delegations, we believed that we had gone very far in an attempt to reconcile various points of view which had been expressed in this Committee. Nevertheless, several delegations requested a further postponement of the vote in order to allow additional consultation in an endeavor to secure even wider agreement.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, we have had additional consultations, and, as a result, we are now proposing one final modification of the United States draft resolution as previously amended.

This modification, together with all previous amendments, is contained in the revised draft resolution A/C.5/L.463, which is now before the Committee.

The amendment which we are proposing today provides for the deletion of the former operative

<sup>a</sup> Made in Committee V on Oct. 9 (U.S. delegation press release 2761).



paragraph c(2)—the paragraph which deals with the years following 1958—and its replacement by three brief paragraphs numbered 2, 3, and 4. The new paragraph 2 refers to the period 1959–1961, for which the Committee on Contributions next year will recommend a new scale of assessments in the usual manner. During that 3-year period, the United States will receive further reductions in its contribution toward the 30 percent level only when new member states are admitted to the organization. This is an expansion of the idea previously incorporated in paragraph c(2), to the effect that the Contributions Committee should give particular consideration to the possibility of reducing the United States contribution by the application of the contributions of new members.

This new paragraph 2 means that, if changes in the scale of assessments for 1959–1961 appear warranted to the Committee on Contributions in the normal course of events—that is, apart from the admission of new members—these adjustments will be made without affecting the contribution of the United States.

The new paragraph 3 assumes the probability that the United States contribution will not be reduced to the 30 percent level during the 1959–1961 period. Accordingly, it provides that thereafter, for the years following 1961, the Committee on Contributions shall recommend such additional steps as may be necessary and appropriate to complete the reduction.

The new paragraph 4 consists of the final sentence of the original paragraph c(2), as amended last Monday.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the amendments which are proposed are quite simple and that it is apparent that they represent a further concession by the United States.

At this time, Mr. Chairman, I wish to express the appreciation of the United States delegation for the support which our proposal has already received from so many other delegations. We appreciate particularly the efforts of those delegations which have made special contributions to the effort to arrive at a general agreement in the Committee.

I trust that we can vote on the revised United States proposal this morning and that an overwhelming majority of this Committee will support the proposal.

## TEXT OF RESOLUTION AS ADOPTED<sup>1</sup>

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 14 (I) of 13 February 1946, 238 (III) of 18 November 1948, and 665 (VII) of 5 December 1952, regarding the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations among its Members and the fixing of the maximum contribution of any one Member State,

*Noting* that when the maximum contribution of any one Member State was fixed at 33.33 per cent effective 1 January 1954, the United Nations consisted of sixty Member States,

*Noting* further that since 1 January 1954, twenty-two Member States have been admitted to the United Nations,

*Recalling* its resolution 1087 (XI) of 21 December 1956, whereby the percentage contributions of the first sixteen new Member States admitted since 1 January 1954, were incorporated into the regular scale of assessments for 1956 and 1957 and these were applied to reduce the percentage contributions of all Member States except that of the highest contributor and those of the Member States paying minimum assessments,

*Noting* that there are now six new Member States, Ghana, Japan, the Federation of Malaya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia whose percentage contributions have not yet been fixed by the Committee on Contributions or incorporated into the 100 per cent scale of assessments,

*Decides* that:

(a) in principle, the maximum contribution of any one Member State to the ordinary expenses of the United Nations shall not exceed 30 per cent of the total;

(b) the percentage contributions fixed by the Committee on Contributions for Japan, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia for 1956 and 1957, and for Ghana and the Federation of Malaya for 1957 shall constitute miscellaneous income of the United Nations;

(c) the Committee on Contributions shall take the following steps in preparing scales of assessment for 1958 and subsequent years:

(1) The percentage contributions fixed by the Committee on Contributions for Ghana, Japan, the Federation of Malaya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia for 1958 shall be incorporated into the 100 per cent scale for 1958. This incorporation shall be accomplished by applying the total amount of the percentage contributions of the six Member States named above to a *pro rata* reduction of the percentage contributions of all Members except those assessed at the minimum rate, taking into account the per capita ceiling principle and any reductions which may be required as a result of a review by the Committee on Contributions at its session commencing 15 October 1957, of appeals from recommendations made previously by that Committee.

(2) During the three-year period of the next scale of assessments, 1959–1961, further steps to reduce the share

<sup>1</sup> Adopted in Committee V on Oct. 9 (see U.N. doc. A/3698) by a vote of 43–17–17 and in plenary session on Oct. 14 by a vote of 39–16–16.

of the largest contributor shall be recommended by the Committee on Contributions when new Member States are admitted.

(3) The Committee on Contributions shall thereafter recommend such additional steps as may be necessary and appropriate to complete the reduction.

(4) The percentage contributions of Member States shall not in any case be increased as a consequence of the present resolution.

## Question of Chinese Representation in the United Nations

*Following are the texts of statements by Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative in the General Assembly, on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations.*

### STATEMENT IN GENERAL COMMITTEE, SEPTEMBER 19

U.S. delegation press release 2732

The delegation of India has requested the inclusion in the agenda of an item on the question of the representation of China in the United Nations. They have characterized this in their explanatory memorandum as an urgent and important matter.

The views of the United States on the subject of China have been set forth in detail on many occasions, and I need not reiterate these views now. Let it suffice that we think that this request should be rejected and that the Assembly should adopt a decision not to consider this matter during its 12th regular session.

The United States, therefore, proposes that the General Committee recommend to the General Assembly the adoption of the following proposal, which I will read out:

The General Assembly,

1. *Decides* to reject the request of India for the inclusion in the agenda of its Twelfth Regular Session of the additional item entitled "The Representation of China in the United Nations", and

2. *Decides* not to consider at its Twelfth Regular Session any proposals to exclude the Representatives of the

Republic of China or to seat the Representatives of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China.

Let me simply say in explanation that this procedure is the same procedure which was moved and adopted in this General Committee last year at the 11th regular session and also at the 6th regular session. So there is a precedent for this.

Part 1 of our resolution is a decision on the question of inscription, namely, to reject the request for inscription.

Part 2 of the resolution falls within the competence of the General Committee to make recommendations to the Assembly on the conduct of its business, and in this form it is a proposal that has been adopted by the General Assembly for several years since 1951.

The United States delegation strongly recommends the expeditious adoption of this resolution in both of its parts in order to get on to the main business of the session. And we agree with the representative of India that this is not the place to discuss substance, and I have not done so.

[In a further statement Mr. Lodge said:]

Mr. President, let me say, first, that I think the representative of India is everlastingly right when he says that here in this General Committee and in this context we should not discuss substance. I shall certainly abide by the position that he has taken in that respect, and I congratulate him for it.

This whole question has been gone into so often before at previous meetings of the General Committee that I will only take a moment to comment on the rules in this regard.

Rule 40 says that the "General Committee . . . shall make recommendations to the General Assembly with regard to each item proposed." I think that is very clear, Mr. President, and I think that explains why previous General Committees have thought it was well within the purview of the General Committee to take an action of this kind.

Then in the last sentence of rule 40, to which the distinguished representative of India alluded—he quoted part of it—he said, "the question whether the General Committee should recommend the inclusion of the item in the agenda, the rejection of the request for inclusion, or the inclusion of the item in the provisional agenda"—I didn't hear,

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maybe he did, but I didn't hear him say that; that was a dependent clause. The whole sentence says, "In considering matters relating to the agenda of the General Assembly, the General Committee shall not discuss the substance of any item, except in so far as . . ."—in other words, that is all related to the question of discussion. I think that's important to bear in mind.

Then the representative of India referred to rule 41 and quoted the last sentence which reads: "It [the General Committee] shall not, however, decide any political question." Well, of course, the rule is right and the representative of India is right. We are not deciding a political question here in the General Committee, and I am not asking the General Committee to decide a political question. We are making a recommendation, and the General Assembly makes the decision.

I contend that this proposal which I have offered is squarely within the rules, and it has been so held to be at previous meetings of the General Committee. I do not think it is fair to say that all of the previous men who have passed on this question were wrong. I think they considered the results; they considered this proposal; and the decision that they made was right. Therefore, I hope that this proposal may be adopted.<sup>1</sup>

#### STATEMENT IN PLENARY, SEPTEMBER 23

U.S. delegation press release 2738

I understand that the rules require all members to confine themselves to procedural aspects and not to discuss the substance. I believe that is correct.

Well, Mr. President, I shall abide by the rules, and I shall not yield to the temptation, which I confess is very strong after hearing the speeches of the Soviet bloc, to go into substance. I am a great believer in orderly procedure, particularly in a world forum like this.

On Thursday, when the General Committee considered the request of India for inclusion in the agenda of an additional item entitled "The Representation of China," the United States moved that this request for inclusion in the agenda be rejected; and, furthermore, that the

Assembly, as it has done since 1951, adopt a decision not to consider the matter during the present regular session.

I should like to read the resolution which is printed on page 2 of the General Committee Report:<sup>2</sup>

[At this point Mr. Lodge again read the text of the resolution.]

The representative of India at that time, as he has done today, challenged the validity of this procedure. You, Mr. President, properly, in our opinion, ruled that the General Committee was competent under rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure to consider the draft resolution submitted by the United States. No one challenged your ruling. The resolution appeared to be wise to most of the members, and the General Committee approved it by a substantial vote.

By your action and that of the Committee in adopting the resolution there can be no question at all as to the propriety of this procedure, nor, do we hope, should there be any doubt as to its wisdom. It is, in fact, the same procedure followed last year and in a previous year—1951, to be exact.

We believe that the report of the General Committee should be upheld. The members are already all familiar with all the underlying factors, and we urge that the Indian amendment be rejected<sup>3</sup> and that the report of the General Committee on this subject be adopted.

#### STATEMENT IN PLENARY, SEPTEMBER 24

U.S. delegation press release 2740

The United States and many of those who share our views about this matter have avoided any discussion of substance, but there has been so much said about substance that, under the right of reply, I wish to speak very briefly about that.

The argument that has been made by those who wish to inscribe this item about the representation of China boils down to the one word "realism."

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/3670.

<sup>3</sup> The Indian amendment (U.N. doc. A/L. 224) read as follows:

"1. In paragraph 1, line 1, for the word 'reject' substitute 'accede to'.

"2. Delete paragraph 2."

<sup>1</sup> The General Committee on Sept. 19 approved the proposed resolution by a vote of 9 to 4, with 2 absents.

In other words, no matter how much you like it or dislike it there it is, and that ought to be enough.

Well, I think that it is true insofar as internal affairs go. It is none of our affair here in the United Nations whether the internal administration of a country is Marxian Communist or Soviet Communist, whether it is liberty-loving believers in social welfare or dictatorial socialists, whether it is competitive capitalism for a great many or monopoly capitalism for a few, or whether it is a mixture of all those things. That is not our business here.

But the question of what they do when they try to spread across their borders is another matter.

We may question, too, how "realistic" the current realism about Communist China is. When one reads the reports of large numbers of refugees streaming into Hong Kong, one remembers Mr. Quisling and the other puppets who governed Europe under Hitler. That makes you remember that the world is in a state of evolution, and that, if there is one state of mind which one should not have in 1957, it is a fatalistic acceptance of the inevitability of things.

But, Mr. President, even if this judgment about the Chinese Communists is realistic, let me point out that the United Nations is an organization that is not engaged in promoting realism. It is an organization that has a moral standard. This hall here is not a mere cockpit in which the criminal and the law-abiding are indiscriminately scrambled up. The United Nations Charter says that member states shall be "peace-loving"—"peace-loving," that is the word.

Now, if some of us here think that this Assembly, this United Nations, should become a cockpit in which the criminal and the law-abiding are indiscriminately scrambled up—and they have a right to that opinion—the thing for them to do is to go and get an amendment to the charter converting the United Nations into that type of organization. They should go ahead by amendment to promote their views. But they should not seek to do it by nullification. That is what is involved in the contemplation before us.

Now, the record shows abundantly that the Chinese Communist regime is not peace-loving. What they did in Korea, what they did in Viet-Nam, what they have done in Tibet, what they have attempted in the Philippines and in Formosa,

and what they have tried to do in Malaya—which was listened to when the representative of Malaya spoke of it with deserving respect—all prove beyond doubt that this Chinese Communist regime is not peace-loving. In fact, I don't think they themselves even pretend to be.

I think as the representative of the United States you would all, putting yourself in my position, understand that I make mention of the fact that, in the United Nations military action in Korea to repel Communist aggression there, we in the United States suffered 140,000 casualties, of which 35,000 were deaths, and that these were almost all of them inflicted by the Chinese Communists—and that is something that it is only human for us to remember.

The fact is, Mr. President, that the United Nations itself officially and formally and after due consideration branded the Chinese Communists aggressors in Korea. And it seems to me reasonable to hold that the United Nations settled this issue when it took that position. If it wants to unsettle it, let it repeal that decision. That has never been done.

Now, Mr. President, before I take my seat, let me say that I speak as a friend of the Chinese people, as one who admires the great soul of the Chinese people, its steadfastness, its courage, its individualism, its culture. I speak as the representative of a country whose citizens have had wonderfully close and intimate relations with the Chinese people ever since the beginning of the United States of America.

We oppose this proposal not because of our disapproval of the interior social system, not because the present regime was not popularly elected, not because it came to power by violence, but simply because to admit the Chinese Communists would stultify the United Nations and would thus destroy the usefulness of the United Nations.

Feeling this way, it must be clear to all how devastatingly divisive debate on this question would be and why, therefore, we urge our colleagues to oppose the Indian amendment and to support the American proposition.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>The Assembly on Sept. 24 accepted the General Committee's recommendation by a vote of 47 to 27, with 7 abstentions. South Africa was absent.



## Election of New Members to Security Council

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge*

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*<sup>1</sup>

The United States is happy to welcome Canada, Japan, and Panama to the Security Council. Their election was a well-deserved vote of confidence by the Assembly for those countries.

The United States is delighted that Japan was elected to the Security Council. We were one of the first to advance the idea that Japan be a member of the Council. We took a very great interest in working for Japan's election. We think Japan will add a great deal to the Council. Japan's leaders have qualities of statesmanship, wisdom, and courage that will contribute greatly to the work here. Japan is playing a leading role for peace in Asia and throughout the world, and I look forward to working with the Japanese delegates in the Council.

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration

The Department of State on October 3 (press release 552) announced the U.S. delegation to the 7th session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) to be held at Geneva, Switzerland, October 7-11, 1957. The Council meeting was preceded by a meeting of the nine-member Executive Committee, which convened on September 26.

Roderic L. O'Connor, Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, will head the delegation; George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Migration, will serve as acting U.S. representative at the Executive Committee meeting and as principal adviser to Mr. O'Connor at the Council meeting.

The U.S. delegation is as follows:

#### U.S. Representative

Roderic L. O'Connor, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State

#### Deputy U.S. Representative

Robert S. McCollum, Deputy Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of State

#### Principal Adviser

George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Migration, Department of State

#### Congressional Advisers

Frank Chelf, House of Representatives

James B. Frazier, Jr., House of Representatives

Byron G. Rogers, House of Representatives

Patrick J. Hillings, House of Representatives

DeWitt S. Hyde, House of Representatives

#### Advisers

Mrs. Edwin Hilson

O. Preston Robinson

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

### Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Latin America. Annual Report to the Economic and Social Council, Covering the Period 15 May 1956-29 May 1957. E/2998, E/CN.12/451, May 29, 1957. 230 pp. mimeo.

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Inland Transport Committee. Official Records. Sixth Session, 15-21 February 1957. E/CN.11/TRANS/129, June 12, 1957. 106 pp. mimeo.

Financial Implications of Actions of the Council. Statement submitted by the Secretary-General. E/3018, June 19, 1957. 23 pp. mimeo.

International Commodity Problems. Organizational and procedural arrangements governing activities in the field of international commodity problems and co-ordination of functions within the framework of the United Nations. E/3012/Add. 1, June 24, 1957. 4 pp. mimeo.

### Disarmament Commission

Fourth Report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. DC/112, August 1, 1957. 88 pp. mimeo.

Fifth Report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. DC/113, September 11, 1957. 144 pp. mimeo.

### Trusteeship Council

Report of the United Nations Commission on Togoland Under French Administration. T/1336/Add.1, August 2, 1957. 41 pp. mimeo.

The Future of Togoland Under French Administration. Draft special report of the Trusteeship Council. Working paper prepared by the Secretariat. T/L.809, September 19, 1957. 5 pp. mimeo.

### Secretariat

Background Paper on Chapter XI of the Charter Concerning Non-Self-Governing Territories. ST/DPI/SER.A/73/Rev.1, April 1, 1957. 79 pp. mimeo.

<sup>1</sup> Made on Oct. 1 (U.S. delegation press release 2750) following the election in the General Assembly of Canada, Japan, and Panama as nonpermanent members of the Security Council.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873.

*Ratifications deposited:* Ethiopia, Greece, Italy, Paraguay, and Peru, September 30, 1957; Cuba and the Federal Republic of Germany, October 1, 1957.

##### Customs Tariffs

Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels July 5, 1890 (26 Stat. 1518), creating an International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs. Done at Brussels December 16, 1949. Entered into force May 5, 1950.

*Proclaimed by the President:* September 16, 1957.

##### Duties and Rights of States

Protocol to the convention on duties and rights of states in the event of civil strife, signed at Habana February 20, 1928 (46 Stat. 2749). Opened for signature at the Pan American Union May 1, 1957.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Cuba, July 19, 1957; Argentina, August 8, 1957; Haiti, August 9, 1957; Dominican Republic, September 17, 1957.

##### Trade and Commerce

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Dated at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955.

*Accession deposited:* Luxembourg, September 9, 1957.

##### United Nations

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.

*Admission to membership:* Federation of Malaya, September 17, 1957.

#### BILATERAL

##### Austria

Agreement regarding certain bonds of Austrian issue denominated in dollars, and protocol. Signed at Washington November 21, 1956. Entered into force September 11, 1957.

*Proclaimed by the President:* September 19, 1957.

##### Colombia

Agreement extending the agreement for a cooperative health program of September 15 and October 20, 1950

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

(TIAS 2203), as modified and supplemented. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá December 31, 1956, and March 15, 1957. Entered into force March 26, 1957, upon signature of operational extension agreement.

Agreement amending the memorandum of understanding attached to the agricultural commodities agreement of April 16, 1957 (TIAS 3817). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá August 29 and September 11, 1957. Entered into force September 11, 1957.

##### Iran

Agreement providing investment guaranties under section 413(b) (4) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 846-847). Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran September 17 and 21, 1957. Entered into force September 24, 1957.

##### Spain

Agreement for the acceptance of certificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid September 23, 1957. Entered into force September 23, 1957.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Recess Appointments

The President on October 3 appointed Homer Morrison Byington, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Federation of Malaya. (For biographic details, see press release 555 dated October 3.)

### Designations

Wilson Thomas Moore Beale, Jr., as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective September 30. (For biographic details, see press release 550 dated October 1.)

William O. Hall as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget and Finance, effective September 30.

### Closing of Consulate and Opening of Consular Agency at Valparaiso

The American Consulate at Valparaiso, Chile, was officially closed on August 31, 1957. A consular agency was opened at Valparaiso on September 1, 1957. The Department has appointed Lucius D. Hill as Consular Agent.

The province of Valparaiso, Easter Island, and the Juan Fernandez Islands, formerly in the Valparaiso Consular District, have been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Embassy at Santiago, Chile.

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### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 30-October 6

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

No.	Date	Subject
549	9/30	NATO journalists visit U.S. (rewrite).
*550	10/1	Beale appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic details).
†551	10/3	Delegation to ILO Iron and Steel Committee (rewrite).
552	10/3	Delegation to ICEM Council (rewrite).
†553	10/3	Intergovernmental Copyright Committee.
*554	10/3	Knight granted personal rank of Minister (biographic details).
*555	10/3	Byington appointed Ambassador to Malaya (biographic details).
*556	10/4	Educational exchange.
557	10/4	Holmes to tour Africa.
558	10/4	ANZUS Council meeting.
559	10/4	U.S.-Yugoslav economic talks.
560	10/5	Dulles-Gromyko meeting.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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How effective has the United Nations been in preventing or stopping aggression and war?

If the United Nations can only recommend, how does it get anything done against war and injustice?

Can the United Nations prevent another world war from ever happening?

Can the United Nations do anything about disarmament?

What do the United Nations aid programs—like the technical assistance program and the United Nations Children's Fund—have to do with world peace?

How much does our membership in the United Nations cost?

Answers to these and other frequently heard questions regarding the United Nations are given by Henry Cabot Lodge, United States Representative to the United Nations, in an illustrated pamphlet recently issued by the Department of State. Twenty-five questions in all are considered in the 40-page publication, which is printed in question-and-answer format.

Copies of *You . . . and the United Nations, 1957* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for 20 cents each.

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